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Abstract
Theories can be produced by individuals seeking a good reputation of knowl-
edge. Hence, a signiﬁcant question is how to test theories anticipating that they
might have been produced by (potentially uninformed) experts who prefer their
theories not to be rejected.
If a theory that predicts exactly like the data generating process is not
rejected with high probability then the test is said to not reject the truth. On
the other hand, if a false expert, with no knowledge over the data generating
process, can strategically select theories that will not be rejected then the test
can be ignorantly passed. These tests have limited use because they cannot
feasibly dismiss completely uninformed experts.
Many tests proposed in the literature (e.g., calibration tests) can be ig-
norantly passed. Dekel and Feinberg (2006) introduced a class of tests that
seemingly have some power of dismissing uninformed experts. We show that
some tests from their class can also be ignorantly passed. One of those tests,
however, does not reject the truth and cannot be ignorantly passed. Thus, this
empirical test can dismiss false experts.
∗We thank Eddie Dekel, Yossi Feinberg, Nabil Al-Najjar, Sandeep Baliga, Roger Myerson and
Rakesh Vohra for useful comments. All errors are ours.
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ment, Northwestern University, 2001 Sheridan Road Evanston IL 60208We also show that a false reputation of knowledge can be strategically sus-
tained for an arbitrary, but given, number of periods, no matted which test is
used (provided that it does not reject the truth). However, false experts can be
discredited, even with bounded data sets, if the domain of permissible theories
is mildly restricted.
1. Introduction
Economists have long realized that the production and the transmission of knowledge
play a central role in economic activity (see Hayek (1945)). Knowledge, however, is
o f t e ns t r u c t u r e da sat h e o r yw h i c hm u s tb et e s t e d .At h e o r yc a nb er e j e c t e di fi tm a k e s
a deterministic prediction that is not observed in the data. Still, in economics and
several other disciplines, theories regularly make probabilistic forecasts that attach
strictly positive probability to all outcomes. This leads to the basic question of how
to test probabilistic theories. If a blunt contradiction between the theory and the
data is impossible then the standard procedure is to employ large data sets so that
any theory must attribute small probability to some events which, if observed, induce
a rejection of the theory. A matter of interest is precisely which low probability
events should be regarded as suﬃciently incompatible with the theory to validate its
rejection.
Assume that the problem at hand requires an understanding of a stochastic process
which generates an outcome that can either be 0 or 1. Before any data is observed,
a potential expert named Bob delivers a theory, deﬁned as a mapping that takes
as an input any ﬁnite string of outcomes and returns as an output a probability of
1. There is a well-known correspondence between theories and probability measures
P over the space of inﬁnite sequences of outcomes. So, henceforth, a theory is a
probability measure P. Bob may be an informed expert who truthfully reveals the
data generating process. However, Bob may also be a false expert who knows nothing
about the data generating process.
A tester named Alice tests Bob’s theory P by selecting an event AP (i.e., a set of
outcome sequences). Alice regards the event AP as consistent with the theory P and
2its complement Ac
P as inconsistent with it. Assume that the acceptance set AP has
high probability according to P, i.e.,
P(AP) ≥ 1 − ε. (1.1)
Then, if Bob’s theory coincides with the data generating process, it will not be rejected
with probability 1 − ε. When equation (1.1) is satisﬁed we say that Alice’s test does
not reject the truth with probability 1 − ε.
Av a s te ﬀort has been dedicated to supply results that take the form of equation
(1.1). The signiﬁcance of these results (such as the law of large numbers, the law of
iterated logarithmic, the central limit theorem) is that they relate the unobservable
concept of a theory P with a potentially observable event AP. So, each of these
ﬁndings can be used to deﬁne an empirical test that does not reject the truth.
An essential feature of a test is the possibility of theory rejection. If it is certain
that a theory will not be rejected then the purpose of the test is far from clear. As
long as Ac
P is a non-empty set, theory rejection is (seemingly) viable because outcome
sequences in Ac
P may be realized. However, even if the rejection set Ac
P is non-empty
B o bm i g h ts t i l lb ea b l et os t r a t e g i c a l l yp r oduce theories in a way that essentially
removes the possibility of rejection.
This might be accomplished without any knowledge of the data generating process.
Assume that Bob, before any data is observed, uses a random device ζ to select his
theory P.A t ﬁrst, Alice cannot tell whether the theory she received was revealed
truthfully by an informed expert or was selected at random by an ignorant expert.
This must be determined by the data. However, assume that for any sequence of out-
comes Bob’s theory P will not be rejected with arbitrarily high probability, according
to Bob’s randomization device ζ. It follows that, no matter which data is realized,
Alice will not reject Bob’s theory (unless Bob had an unlucky draw from ζ which is,
by deﬁnition, near impossible). If such a device ζ can be constructed, we say that the
test can be ignorantly passed. On the other hand, if for every random generator of
theories ζ there exists at least one sequence of outcomes such that, if realized, leads
to theory rejection (with high probability according to ζ)t h e nw es a yt h a tt h et e s t
3cannot be manipulated. A test that does not reject the truth with high probability
and cannot be manipulated is called an eﬀective test.
As aforementioned, a test that is not eﬀective has limited purpose if Bob produces
theories strategically. Alice has no reason to run a test that delivers the same verdict
to both polar cases of an expert who knows the data generating process and a false
expert who knows nothing about it. However, a test that is eﬀective has hitherto
not been proven to exist.1 The inexistence of an eﬀective test would impose a con-
ceptual limit on the capability of empirical analysis. Theorems in probability can be
demonstrated and subsequently used to construct statistical tests that do not reject
the truth, but the value of any test is doubtful if it can be ignorantly passed. Hence,
a fundamental question is whether an eﬀective test exists.
The calibration test requires the empirical frequency of 1 to be close to p in the
periods that 1 was forecasted with probability close to p. Foster and Vohra (1998)
show that the calibration test can be ignorantly passed with probability one. So, it is
possible to produce forecasts that in the future will prove to be calibrated, no matter
which data sequence is eventually realized.
The Foster and Vohra (1998) result has been extended and several other tests have
been suggested (see, for example, Lehrer (2001)).2 Still, these tests can be ignorantly
passed with probability one. However, the literature has not yet explored all possible
tests.
Natural candidates for eﬀective tests are associated with small acceptance sets.
By deﬁnition, the acceptance set of a category test is a ﬁrst category set, i.e., a
countable union of nowhere dense sets. Such sets are considered small in topology. A
1The only exception is a test suggested by Dekel and Feinberg (2006), but this test is based on
the continuum hypothesis and, hence, it is not proven to exist with standard axioms.
2We also refer the reader to Cahn (2005), Foster and Young (2003), Fudenberg and Levine (1995,
1999a, 1999b), Hart (2005), Hart and Mas-Colell (2000, 2001), Lehrer and Solan (2003), Rustichini
(1999), Kalai, Lehrer and Smorodinsky (1999), Sandroni, Smorodinsky and Vohra (2003), and Vovk
and Shafer (2004) for related work.
4classic result shows the existence of category tests that do not reject the truth with
probability one. Dekel and Feinberg (2006) show that any theory fails with probability
one any category test, unless the data generating process belongs to a ﬁrst category
set (that includes the announced theory). So, Bob’s prospects of passing any category
test may seem negligible, but they are not. We show that some category tests can be
ignorantly passed.
A theory is said falsiﬁable if, for every ﬁnite history, there is a ﬁnite continuation
history that the theory assigns probability zero to it. The falsiﬁability test rejects out
of hand (i.e., on all paths) any non-falsiﬁable theory. A falsiﬁable theory is rejected
if and only if it assigns zero probability to the observed (ﬁnite) data. We show that
the falsiﬁability test is a category test. Moreover, we show that the falsiﬁability test
can be ignorantly passed with arbitrarily high probability.
Bob, if uninformed, does not know the likelihood that any given falsiﬁable theory
will be falsiﬁed. In addition, no matter which theory he announces, it will be rejected
with probability one for all actual data generating processes, except for a few of them
(i.e., a ﬁrst category set). However, Bob can generate falsiﬁable theories at random
so that, for any data, the realized theory will not be falsiﬁed, with arbitrarily high
probability. By themselves, the falsiﬁability criteria are powerless to turn out an
eﬀective test.
Empirical tests can be classiﬁed into two kinds: acceptance tests and rejection
tests. An acceptance test accepts a theory in ﬁnite time when the data is judged
consistent enough with it. Rejection may occur at inﬁnity. A rejection test rejects a
theory in ﬁnite time when the data is judged inconsistent enough with it. Acceptance
may occur at inﬁnity. A test that is both an acceptance and rejection test must stop
at some ﬁnite time (that depends upon the announced theory) and either reject or
accept the theory.
We show that any acceptance test that does not reject the truth with high prob-
ability can be ignorantly passed with high probability. Hence, consider an arbitrary
deﬁnition of which set of ﬁnite data is consistent with any given theory. Assume that,
with high probability, the test will not regard a theory that predicts exactly like the
5data generating process as inconsistent with the data. Then, with no knowledge over
the data, it is possible to produce theories that will prove to be consistent with the
data.
In contrast, we construct a rejection test, called the global category test, that does
not reject the truth with arbitrarily high probability and that cannot be manipulated.
Hence, an eﬀective empirical test does exist. This result reduces the conceptual bound
that would otherwise (if an eﬀective test did not exist) be imposed on the purpose
of testing probabilistic theories. For any given theory, we can identify a set of ﬁnite
data, deemed as inconsistent with it, which allows for the possibility of rejecting false
theories, even if they are strategically produced.
The global category test discredits uninformed experts in a strong sense. Given
any random generator of theories ζ, let the revelation set consists of the paths on which
ζ fails the test with probability one. We show that for every ζ,t h er e v e l a t i o ns e to f
the global category test is not only non-empty (which makes rejection of false experts
feasible), but also large enough to have full measure for all probability measures, save
a ﬁrst category set of them.
The critical diﬀerence between the global category test and the tests proposed in
the literature (e.g., calibration tests) is that the latter cannot dismiss false experts, but
the former can. This distinction is enhanced by the ﬁnding that an uniformed expert,
if tested by the global category test, experiences inevitable failure on a topologically
large set of paths. So, the dismissal of an uninformed expert is both feasible and
plausible.
Our results imply an asymmetry between acceptance and rejection tests: No ac-
ceptance test is eﬀective, but some rejection tests are eﬀective. This asymmetry
merits some emphasis (although it departs from our main subject) because it gives
formal support to a guiding principle: theories must be accepted until revealed to be
in conﬂict with the data rather than rejected until shown to be in agreement with it.
We now turn to the question of how long it takes to discredit false experts. We say
that rejection can be delayed for m periods if theories can be strategically generated at
random so that, for any sequence of outcomes, the realized theory will not be rejected
6before period m with high probability, according to the randomization device. We
show that for any period m, and for any test that does not reject the truth with high
probability, rejection can be delayed for m periods. Thus, Bob may not be able to
eternally sustain a false reputation of being knowledgeable, but Bob can maintain a
false reputation within an arbitrarily long time horizon. It follows that, with bounded
data sets, it might be unfeasible for Alice to obtain any signiﬁcant information on
whether Bob is a knowledgeable expert.
The fact that false experts can delay rejection poses a severe diﬃculty for the
empirical testing of probabilistic theories. This diﬃculty seems unavoidable unless
we relax the assumption that the test does not reject the truth. Thus, we allow tests
to reject some theories out of hand (i.e., on all data sets and, therefore, independently
of the data). This is not a desiderata, but it is a necessary recourse.
We construct an empirical test that rejects out hand the theories that frequently
forecast 1 and 0 with probability near 0.5. The test requires the empirical frequency
of each outcome to be high in the periods that they were forecasted with probability
appreciably greater than 0.5.T h i st e s ti sr e l a t e d ,b u tn o ti dentical, to tests used for
meteorological forecasts and also to calibration tests. We show that this test does not
reject, with high probability, any allowed theory.
Moreover, Bob, if uninformed, cannot assure himself a long rejection delay of his
theories. Thus, a rejection of strategically produced theories is feasible with bounded
data sets if we impose mild restrictions on the class of permitted theories.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we introduce our main concepts,
show some examples of empirical tests, and demonstrate that acceptance tests are not
eﬀective. In section 3, we show that the falsiﬁability test can be ignorantly passed. In
section 4, the global category test is presented and its properties are demonstrated.
In section 5, we show that if the truth is not rejected then rejection can be arbitrarily
delayed. In section 6, we construct a test such that a false expert cannot ensure a long
reputation of knowledge. Section 7 concludes the paper. Proofs are in the appendix.
72. Empirical Tests
Each period one outcome, 0 or 1, is observed.3 Let Ω = {0,1}∞ be the set of all
paths, i.e., inﬁnite histories. A ﬁnite history sm ∈ {0,1}m,m≥ t, is a extension of
st ∈ {0,1}t if the ﬁrst t outcomes of sm coincide with st. Analogously, a path s ∈ Ω
extends st if s =( st,...). In the opposite direction, let sm | t be the ﬁrst t outcomes
of a ﬁnite history sm ∈ {0,1}m,m≥ t. Analogously, s | t = st for any path s that
extends st ∈ {0,1}t. A cylinder with base on st is the set C(st) ⊂ {0,1}∞ of all
inﬁnite extensions of st.W e e n d o w Ω with the topology that comprises of unions
of cylinders with ﬁnite base. Let =t be the algebra that consists of all ﬁnite unions
of cylinders with base on {0,1}t. Denote by N the set of natural numbers. Let = is
the σ-algebra generated by the algebra =0 ≡
S
t∈N
=t, i.e., = is the smallest σ−algebra
which contains =0.
Let ∆(Ω) the set of all probability measures on (Ω,=).W ee n d o w∆(Ω) with the
weak*-topology and with the σ−algebra of Borel sets, (i.e., the smallest σ−algebra
which contains all open sets in weak*-topology).4 Let ∆∆(Ω) be the set of probability
measures on ∆(Ω).






that maps ﬁnite histories into next period’s forecasts, i.e., a probability of 1 next
period.5 It is well known that f deﬁnes a probability measure P ∈ ∆(Ω) on the
space of paths. To simplify the language, a probability measure in ∆(Ω) is also called
a theory. That is, a theory is identiﬁed with it’s predictions. Before any data is
3It is immediate to extend the results to the case where there are ﬁnitely many possible outcomes
in each period.
4The weak*-topology consists of all unions of ﬁnite intersections of sets of the form
©
Q ∈ ∆(Ω):




where P ∈ ∆(Ω), ε>0,a n dh is a real-valued and continuous function on Ω. We refer the reader
to Rudin (1973), Chapter 3, for this deﬁnition and for basic results regarding the weak*-topology.
5By convention, {0,1}0 = {∅}.
8observed, Bob announces his theory P ∈ ∆(Ω). A tester, named Alice, tests Bob’s
theory empirically.6
Deﬁnition 1. A test is a function T : Ω × ∆(Ω) → {0,1}.
A test is an arbitrary function that takes as an input a theory and a path and
returns, as an output, either 0 or 1. When the test returns a 1, the test does not
reject the theory based on the path. When a 0 is returned, the theory is rejected.
A test divides paths into those (AP) ≡ {s ∈ Ω| T(s,P)=1 } where the theory
P is not rejected and those (AP)
c where the theory is rejected. The set AP is called
the acceptance set. The set (AP)
c is called the rejection set. We consider only tests
T such that the acceptance sets AP are =−measurable. Fix ε ∈ [0,1].
Deﬁnition 2. A test T does not reject the truth with probability 1 − ε if for any
P ∈ ∆(Ω)
P {s ∈ Ω | T(s,P)=1 } > 1 − ε.
A test does not reject the truth if the actual data generating process is not rejected
with high probability. A theory that fails such a test can be (with high conﬁdence)
reliably viewed as false.
M a n yr e s u l t si np r o b a b i l i t ya n ds t a t i s t i c st a k et h ef o r m
P(AP)=1or, more generally, P(AP) > 1 − ε.
These results (such as the law of large numbers, the law of iterated logarithms,
the central limit theorem) relate the unobservable concept of a probability measure
P ∈ ∆(Ω) with a (potentially) observable set of paths AP ∈ =.7 A successful result
6It might be worth emphasizing that even though Alice tests Bob’s theory using a string of
outcomes, we do not make distributional assumptions such as an independent, identically distributed
process. These are strong and diﬃcult to validate assumptions. If, before any data was observed,
Alice knew that the actual process belongs to a small set such as independent, identically distributed
processes then she could infer the actual process from the data, with no need for an informed expert.
7Some of these ﬁndings were initially demonstrated within a class of theories, but martingale
techniques allow these distributional assumptions to be relaxed.
9showing that a well deﬁned event occurs almost surely (or with high probability) can
be used to construct a test that does not reject the truth. Over several decades, many
empirical tests have been developed. Below we show a few well-known examples of
them.
2.1. Classic examples of tests
Given a theory P ∈ ∆(Ω), path s ∈ Ω, and st = s | t,l e t
f
P





be forecasts made along s.8 Denote by It(s) the t−th coordinate of s.T h et e s t








t−1(s) − It(s)] = 0,
requires the average forecast of 1 to match the empirical frequency of 1.L e h r e r
(2001) considered tests that require the match between average forecasts and empirical
frequencies to occur on several subsequences such as even periods, odd periods, etc.
The calibration test of Foster and Vohra (1998) requires the empirical frequency of 1
to be near p ∈ [0,1] in the periods that 1 was forecasted with probability close to p.
An example of a well-known test (not based on matching empirical frequencies)
is the likelihood test: Let a : ∆(Ω) −→ ∆(Ω) be any function such that Pa ≡ a(P)
and P are singular (P⊥Pa).9 The likelihood test T is deﬁned by




=0 ,s n = s | n.
The likelihood test requires the theory P to outperform an alternative theory Pa
in the sense that, on the observed path s, the likelihood of Pa becomes arbitrarily
smaller than the likelihood of P.
A proof that the calibration and likelihood tests do not reject the truth with
probability one can be found in Dawid (1982, 1985).
8If P(C(st)) = 0 then fP
t (s) is arbitrarily deﬁned.
9P and Pa are singular if there is a set A ∈ = such that P(A)=1and Pa(A)=0 .
102.2. Passing tests without knowledge
Consider the uninteresting test such that the acceptance set of a theory ¯ P is the
entire space of paths Ω. This test does not reject ¯ P on any path. Hence, Bob can
pass this test by simply announcing ¯ P. No knowledge over the data generating process
is required. More generally, Bob may be able to pass other tests (on all paths) by
selecting theories at random.
Deﬁnition 3. At e s tT can be ignorantly passed with probability 1−ε if there exists
a random generator of theories ζT ∈ ∆∆(Ω) such that for every path s ∈ Ω
ζT {P ∈ ∆(Ω) | T(s,P)=1 } > 1 − ε.10
The random generator ζT may depend on the test T, but not on any knowledge
of the actual data generating process. If a test can be ignorantly passed then for
any given path s ∈ Ω, the acceptance set AP contains s, with ζT−probability 1 − ε.
Hence, Bob can randomly select theories such that, with probability 1−ε (according
to Bob’s randomization device), will not be rejected, no matter which path is realized.
A test that can be ignorantly passed delivers the same verdict to experts who
knows the data generating process and to experts who knows nothing about it. Thus,
a test that can be ignorantly passed cannot determine whether an expert has relevant
knowledge (i.e., knowledge the tester does not have).
Assume that for every random generator of theories ζ ∈ ∆∆(Ω) there exists at
least one path s such that, with probability greater than ε, the realized theory is
rejected on s. Then, by deﬁnition, the test cannot be passed with probability 1 − ε.
As i n g l ep a t hi nw h i c hr e j e c t i o nm a yo c c u rs u ﬃces as evidence that the test cannot
be passed. However, a stronger property may be demanded. The tester may be
interested in paths such that an uninformed expert fails the test with near certainty
(as opposed to positive probability).
10This deﬁnition requires a measurability provision on the sets {P ∈ ∆(Ω) | T(s,P)=1 }.H o w -
ever, in this paper, either we consider concrete examples of tests and random generators of theories,
for which there is no measurability issue or, for general tests, we limit ourselves to random generators
of theories with ﬁnite support, which automatically resolves the issue of measurability.
11Deﬁnition 4. Fix a test T. Given a random generator of theories ζ ∈ ∆∆(Ω) and
ε ≥ 0, let Rε
ζ ⊆ Ω be the set of all paths s ∈ Ω such that
ζ {P ∈ ∆(Ω) | T(s,P)) = 0} ≥ 1 − ε.
The set Rε
ζ is called the revelation set, where the random generator of theories ζ
fails to manipulate the test with probability 1 − ε.
Deﬁnition 5. A test T cannot be ε−manipulated, ε ≥ 0, if for every random gener-
ator of theories ζ ∈ ∆∆(Ω), the revelation set Rε
ζ is not empty.11
Theory rejection is feasible if the test that cannot be manipulated. No matter
which random generator of theories is used, there exists at least of a path that induces,
with probability 1 − ε, the rejection of the realized theory.
The calibration tests of Foster and Vohra (1998) and Lehrer (2001) are such that
for every theory P ∈ ∆(Ω) the rejection set (AP)
c is not empty. So, for any given
theory, there are paths in which the theory is rejected. So, it may seem that the-
ory rejection is viable, but this feasibility is eﬀectively removed because calibration
tests can be ignorantly passed. An actual prospect of theory rejection requires a
demonstration that the revelation sets are not empty.
Deﬁnition 6. A test is ε-eﬀective, ε ≥ 0,i fi td o e sn o tr e j e c tt h et r u t hw i t hp r o b a -
bility 1 − ε and cannot be ε−manipulated.
2.3. Acceptance and Rejection Tests
In general, a test may reject and accept theories at inﬁnity. Hence, some structure
is needed to preserve the interpretation of a test as a mechanism of relating the
unobservable concept of a theory with potentially observable data.
Deﬁnition 7. Acceptance tests are such that, for all theories P ∈ ∆(Ω), the accep-
tance set AP is a union of cylinders with base on a ﬁnite history. Rejection tests are
such that, for all theories P ∈ ∆(Ω), the rejection set (AP)
c is a union of cylinders
with base on a ﬁnite history.
11I fat e s tc a n n o tb e0−manipulated then we simply say that it cannot be manipulated.
12An acceptance test stops, at some ﬁnite time, when the observed data is deemed
consistent enough with the announced theory. A rejection test stops, at some ﬁnite
time, when the data is regarded as inconsistent enough with the announced theory.
A ﬁnite test is both a rejection and an acceptance test.
Proposition 1. Fix ε ∈ [0,1] and δ ∈ (0,1 − ε]. Let T be an acceptance test that
does not reject the truth with probability 1 − ε. Then, the test T can be ignorantly
passed with probability 1 − ε − δ.
Assume that Alice’s test does not reject the truth and accepts Bob’s theory only if
the data supports the theory (i.e., the observed history belongs to the acceptance set).
Then, an uninformed expert can produce theories at random such that, no matter
which path is observed, the realized theory will be supported by the data, with high
probability. Thus, no relevant knowledge is necessary to produce theories that will,
in the future, prove to be supported by the data.12
The widespread practice of supplying theories that account for the facts is vulner-
able to the usual reproach centered at the existence of alternative theories that also
explain the data. Let us say that a theory P is consistent with the data st ∈ {0,1}t if
C(st) is contained in the acceptance set of a test T.G i v e nst, it is straightforward to
ﬁnd multiple theories consistent with it. Proposition 1 shows that, without knowing
the data, Bob can fabricate theories that are consistent with it. This result makes
the standard critique salient.
By proposition 1, the use of acceptance tests are fairly limited. No acceptance
test is eﬀective. We now explore rejection tests.
12Proposition 1 is a surprising result. Assume that Alice writes a long sentence of zeros and ones.
Bob simulataneously selects a probability measure over all possible sentences. Alice extracts a set A
of ﬁnite sentences that has high probability according to Bob’s choice. She agrees to accept that Bob
has some relevant signal if her sentence belongs to A (in this illustration, Alice combines the roles
of Nature and tester). Bob knows which set A A l i c ee x t r a c t sf r o ma n yg i v e nt h e o r y ,b u th ek n o w s
nothing about what Alice has written. He can (almost) assure himself that her sentence belongs to
his extracted set A.
13Deﬁnition 8. A test T2 is harder than a test T1 if
{s ∈ Ω| T2(s,P)=1 } ⊆ {s ∈ Ω| T1(s,P)=1 }.
If T2 is harder than T1 then rejection by T1 implies rejection by T2.
Proposition 2. Fix δ ∈ (0,1]. Let T1 be any test that does not reject the truth with
probability 1 −ε. There exists a rejection test T2 that is harder than the test T1 and
does not reject the truth with probability 1 − ε − δ.
Proposition 2 shows that given any test T1 there exists a rejection test T2 that
does not reject the truth with almost equally high probability as T1 does, and the
rejection sets of T2 contain those of T1. Thus, if T1 has non-empty revelation sets then
T2 is a rejection test with non-empty revelation sets. We refer to T2 as the rejection
test associated with the test T1.
2.4. Intuition of Proposition 1 and Proof of Proposition 2
Consider the following game zero-sum game between Nature and Bob. Nature chooses
a probability measure P ∈ ∆(Ω). Bob chooses a random generator of theories ζ ∈
∆∆(Ω). Bob’s payoﬀ is EζEPT, where EP and Eζ are the expectation operators
associated with P and ζ, respectively.
By assumption, the test T does not reject the truth with probability 1−ε. There-
fore, for every strategy P of Nature, there is a strategy ζP for Bob (that assigns
probability one to P)s u c ht h a tB o b ’ sp a y o ﬀ
E
ζPE
PT = P {s ∈ Ω | T(s,P)=1 }
is greater than 1 − ε. Hence, if the conditions of Fan’s MinMax are satisﬁed then
there is a strategy ζT for Bob that ensures Bob a payoﬀ arbitrarily close to 1−ε, no
matter which strategy Nature chooses. In particular, Nature could use Ps, selecting
as i n g l ep a t hs with certainty. Therefore, for all s ∈ {0,1}∞,
E
ζTE
PsT = ζT {P ∈ ∆(Ω) | T(s,P)=1 } ≥ 1 − ε − δ.
14Fan’s MinMax theorem requires the payoﬀ of one of the players to be lower semi-
continuous and the strategy space of that player to be compact. As is well-known,
∆(Ω) is compact in the weak*-topology. The lower semi-continuous of Bob’s payoﬀ
follows from the openness of the acceptance sets. It is here that the assumption of an
acceptance test is used. In the case of a rejection test, Bob’s payoﬀ function is upper
semi-continuous.
Proposition 2 is a direct corollary of the following well-known result: for any given
probability measure P ∈ ∆(Ω) and δ>0,a n ys e tA ∈ = c a nb ee n l a r g e dt oa no p e n
set U ⊃ A such that P(U) <P(A)+δ (see Ulam’s Theorem, 7.1.4 in Dudley (1989)).
3. Category Tests
Category tests can de deﬁned as follows: Given a set A,l e t ¯ A be the closure of A.
A set A is called nowhere dense when the interior of its closure, ¯ A, is empty. A
ﬁrst category set is a countable union of nowhere dense sets. A ﬁrst category set is
(topologically) small. The complement of a ﬁrst category set is (topologically) large.13
Category tests are such that, for any theory P ∈ ∆(Ω), the acceptance set AP is
a ﬁrst category set. Proposition 3 below shows the existence of category tests that
do not reject the truth.
Proposition 3. Fix δ ∈ (0,1]. Given any probability measure P ∈ ∆(Ω),t h e r ei sa
closed set DP ∈ = with empty interior such that
P(DP) ≥ 1 − δ.
In particular, there exists a ﬁrst category set D
/
P such that P(D
/
P)=1 .P r o p o -
sition 3 is classic result (see Oxtoby (1980), Theorem 16.5 and Dekel and Feinberg
(2006)). It shows that any theory makes at least one sharp prediction: a path in a
topologically small set will be realized.
13There are others deﬁnitions of small sets that we have not examined (see Anderson and Zame
(2001) and Stinchcombe (2001)).
15Proposition 4. Dekel and Feinberg (2006). Given any ﬁrst category set A ∈ =,t h e
set of probability measures that assign positive probability to A,
{P ∈ ∆(Ω) | P(A) > 0}
is a a ﬁrst category subset of ∆(Ω).
By proposition 4, any theory will be rejected by a category test for all data gener-
ating processes except for a topologically small set of them. A suﬃciently close match
between the announced theory and the data generating process seems to be a prereq-
uisite to pass a category test. So, one may conjecture that, apart from extraordinary
coincidence, a completely uninformed expert ﬁnd it impossible to pass a category
test. However, this does not necessarily hold. We show an example of a category test
that can be ignorantly passed with arbitrarily high probability. Topologically large
rejection sets may not deliver feasible rejection of false experts.
3.1. Falsiﬁability
Category tests are deﬁned by topological concepts. A more intuitive way of under-
standing these tests is to relate them to the celebrated concepts of Popper (1958).
Popper is interested in a demarcation criteria that would diﬀerentiate scientiﬁci d e a s
from non-scientiﬁc ideas (and, hence, would give meaning to the term scientiﬁc). He
proposes that scientiﬁct h e o r i e sa r et h o s et h a tc a nb ef a l s i ﬁed (i.e., rejected by the
data).
Falsiﬁability is a central concept in near all scientiﬁc disciplines. Here, falsiﬁability
must be understood as the possibility of conclusive empirical rejection. This is not
the same as the canonical principle in statistics that the observation of events that
were ex-ante deemed unlikely (by the theory) may suﬃce for it’s rejection.
Deﬁnition 9. At h e o r yP ∈ ∆(Ω) is falsiﬁable if, for every ﬁnite history st ∈ {0,1}t,
there is an extension sm of st such that
P(C(sm)) = 0. (3.1)
16So, a theory is falsiﬁable if, after any ﬁnite history, there is a ﬁnite sequence of
outcomes that bluntly contradicts it.










i.e., the paths that do not bluntly contradict a falsiﬁable theory P.
The falsiﬁability test rejects non-falsiﬁable theories out of hand (i.e., on all paths).
Any falsiﬁable theory bluntly contradicted by the data is also rejected. Formally, the
falsiﬁability test T is deﬁned by
T(s,P)=1 if s ∈ ¯ AP and P ∈ z;
T(s,P)=0 otherwise.
Proposition 5. Fix ε ∈ (0,1]. The falsiﬁability test is a category test. Moreover,
the falsiﬁability test can be ignorantly passed with probability 1 − ε.
By proposition 5, it is possible to produce falsiﬁable theories at random such that,
with arbitrarily high probability, the realized theory will not be falsiﬁed, regardless
of which data is eventually observed.
By deﬁnition, falsiﬁability means the possibility of empirical rejection. In itself,
this possibility is rendered immaterial because the falsiﬁability test can be ignorantly
passed. The falsiﬁability criteria are too weak to produce an eﬀective test.
Propositions 4 and 5 show an interesting contrast. Any theory is rejected by the
falsiﬁability test, unless data generating processes belongs to a ﬁrst category set (that
depends on the announced theory). However, Bob, without any knowledge over the
actual process, can ignorantly pass the falsiﬁability test.
Dekel and Feinberg (2006) show that if the continuum hypothesis holds true then
there exists a category test that does not reject the truth and cannot be manipu-
lated. This result is an important achievement, but it does not show the existence
of an eﬀective test because it relies on the continuum hypothesis. It leaves open
the possibility that, like the continuum hypothesis, the existence of their test is an
undecidable question with standard axioms.
173.2. Intuition of Proposition 5
It is straightforward to show that the falsiﬁability test is a category test. The ac-
ceptance set of a non-falsiﬁable theory is empty and, hence, of ﬁrst category. The
rejection set of a falsiﬁable theory is open (as unions of cylinders with ﬁnite base)
and, by deﬁnition, dense. Hence, the acceptance set of a falsiﬁable theory is closed
and nowhere dense.
The intuition that the falsiﬁability test can be ignorantly passed is as follows:
Consider an increasing sequence of natural numbers Zt,t∈ N, and a sequence of
independent random variables such that each variable is uniformly distributed over
the ﬁnite set Xt ≡ {0,1}(Zt+1−Zt). Given x =( xt,x t ∈ Xt),l e tPx be a falsiﬁable
theory that is rejected if and only if, for some t ∈ N, xt occurs between periods Zt
and Zt+1. Now assume that Zt grows suﬃciently fast (and Z1 is suﬃciently large) so
that the chances that xt,t∈ N, be realized (at least) once is small. Let the falsiﬁable
theory Px be selected if x is selected. Fix any path s =( y1,...,yt,...),y t ∈ Xt. The
selected theory Px will be falsiﬁed on s if and only if xt = yt for some t ∈ N. By
construction, this is an unlikely event.
4. An Eﬀective Test
In this section, we construct a test that does not reject the truth and cannot be
manipulated. Let s1,s 2,... be a countable dense subset of Ω.F i x k ∈ N. For every
path si, there exists a period t ∈ N such that the cylinder Ck
P(si











Indeed, the sequence of sets Ck
P(si
t)−{si} is descending (as t goes to inﬁnity), and
its intersection is empty. So, P(Ck
P(si
t) − {si}) goes to zero as t goes to inﬁnity.
Let t(i,k,P) be the smallest natural number such that (4.1)i ss a t i s ﬁed. We deﬁne
Ai
k(P) ≡ Ω − Ck
P(si
t) as the complement of Ck
P(si














18Each set Ak(P) is an intersection of closed sets and, hence, it is closed. By
construction, each set Ak(P) has an empty interior, and hence, ˆ AP is a ﬁrst category
set.
The global category test ˆ T is such that ˆ AP is the acceptance set of P ∈ ∆(Ω).
That is,
ˆ T(s,P)=1 if s ∈ ˆ AP;
ˆ T(s,P)=0 if s/ ∈ ˆ AP.
Let ˆ R0
ζ be the revelation set where the random generator of theories ζ ∈ ∆∆(Ω)
fails to manipulate the global category test with probability one.
Proposition 6. The global category test ˆ T does not reject the truth with probability
one and it cannot be manipulated. Moreover, given any random generator of theories
ζ ∈ ∆∆(Ω), the revelation set ˆ R0
ζ is such that P( ˆ R0
ζ)=1for every probability
measure P ∈ ∆(Ω), except for, at most, a ﬁrst category set of them.
The global category test controls the type I error of rejecting an informed expert
and the type II error of accepting an uniformed expert. The informed expert passes
the global category test with probability one. The uninformed expert can employ any
random generator of theories ζ, but failure is inevitable on the paths of the revelation
set ˆ R0
ζ. This set is large enough so that all probability measures, except for a ﬁrst
category set, assign probability one to it.
The tests proposed in the literature are strikingly diﬀerent from the global category
test. In contrast to the preceding tests, the global category test can discredit an
uniformed expert. Moreover, it is not only feasible to reject an uninformed expert. It
is also plausible given that, no matter how Bob randomizes, rejection is near certain
outside a ﬁrst category set of data generating processes.
Given ε>0, let ˆ Tε be a rejection test, associated with the global category test ˆ T,
that does not reject the truth with probability 1−ε. Corollary 1, below, is immediate
from propositions 2 and 6.
19Corollary 1. The rejection test ˆ Tε does not reject the truth with probability 1 − ε
and it cannot be manipulated. The revelation sets of ˆ Tε contain the revelation sets of
the global category test and, hence, also have full measure for all probability measures
P ∈ ∆(Ω), except for, at most, a ﬁrst category set of them.
Corollary 1 shows the existence of an eﬀective rejection test ˆ Tε. Hence, for any
given theory P, the test ˆ Tε demarcates the rejection set of P as the set of ﬁnite
histories of outcomes that must be regarded as suﬃciently inconsistent with the theory
P to validate it’s rejection. So, if an outcome sequence in the rejection set of the theory
P is observed then P must be rejected. This result delivers an empirical test that
takes into account that theories might be strategically produced. If Alice adopts the
test ˆ Tε then false experts can be discredited.
In addition, corollary 1, in conjunction with proposition 1,s h o w sab a s i ca s y m -
metry between acceptance and rejection tests. Every acceptance test that does not
reject the truth can be ignorantly passed, but there exists a rejection test that does
not reject the truth and cannot be manipulated. So, propositions 1, 2, and 6, com-
bined, deliver a formal support to the maxim that testable theories must be accepted
until proven inconsistent with the data rather than rejected until proven consistent
with the data.
Proposition 6 removes the conceptual bound that would be imposed on the sig-
niﬁcance of empirical testing of theories if an eﬀective test did not exist. An eﬀective
test has a clear purpose. It does not reject a theory that coincides with the data gen-
erating process and it may, for some realizations of the data, reject the false theories
of an uninformed expert. Thus, a rejection verdict from an eﬀective test is feasible
and the rejected theories are, almost surely, false.
4.1. Intuition of Proposition 6
The proof that the global category test does not reject the truth follows from the fact
that, for any k ∈ N, the rejection set of a theory P i sc o n t a i n e di nt h eu n i o ni =1 ,...
of all cylinders Ck
P(si
t) (minus the paths si). By (4.1), the probability of this union is
20less than 2−k. Given that this holds for any k ∈ N, the probability of any rejection
set is zero.
The intuition for the proof that the global category test cannot be manipulated
is follows: Each acceptance set ˆ AP is a ﬁrst category set that has P−full measure.
So, once Bob proposes a theory, he passes the test if the observed path belongs to
a topologically small acceptance set and is rejected on a topologically large rejection
set. This creates a diﬃculty for an uninformed expert. By itself, this diﬃculty is not
unsurpassable as demonstrated by proposition 5. The main idea is that, in a global
category test, all acceptance sets (for diﬀerent theories P) are constructed around
the same paths {si}. Acceptance sets of diﬀerent theories are suﬃciently close to
each other so that, for any random generator of theories ζ,t h eunion of ζ−almost all
acceptance sets is a ﬁrst category set of paths. By deﬁnition, failure is unavoidable
outside this union. So, by proposition 4, except for a topologically small set, this
union has probability zero for all probability measures.
5. Delaying Rejection
A natural concern with proposition 6 is that the revelation sets ˆ R0
ζ might not contain
any cylinders with ﬁnite base. However, it follows from the proof of proposition 6 that
for every ε>0 and ζ ∈ ∆∆(Ω), the revelation set ˆ Rε
ζ,w h e r eζ fails to manipulate
the global category test with probability 1 − ε, contains an open and dense set (by
proposition 4, this set has probability one for all probability measures, except for,
at most, a ﬁrst category set of them). If a path on this set is realized then, with
probability 1 − ε, in some ﬁnite time, the global category test fails an uninformed
expert. This result, however, does not determine the exact periods that an uninformed
expert fails.
Deﬁnition 10. At e s tT rejects a theory P ∈ ∆(Ω) on a ﬁnite history st ∈ {0,1}t
(denoted T(st,P)=0 )if T(s,P)=0for all paths s that extend st.
So, a test rejects a theory on a ﬁnite history st if it rejects the theory on all paths
s such that the ﬁrst t outcomes of s are st.
21Deﬁnition 11. Rejection by a test T can be delayed by m periods with probability
1−ε if there exists a random generator of theories ζT,m ∈ ∆∆(Ω) such that for every
path sm ∈ {0,1}m,
ζT,m{P ∈ ∆(Ω) | T(sm,P)=1 } ≥ 1 − ε.
Rejection by a test T can be arbitrarily delayed with probability 1−ε if it can be
delayed by m periods, with probability 1 − ε, for every m ∈ N.
If rejection can be arbitrarily delayed then Bob can ﬁrst choose an arbitrary period
m and then randomly select theories such that, with high probability (according to
Bob’s randomization), will not be rejected before period m, no matter which path is
realized.
Proposition 7. Fix ε ∈ [0,1] and δ ∈ (0,1 − ε]. Let T be an arbitrary test that
does not reject the truth with probability 1 − ε. Then, rejection by the test T can
arbitrarily delayed with probability 1 − ε − δ.
Proposition 7 shows that Bob can maintain a false reputation of being a knowl-
edgeable expert for an arbitrarily long time horizon. This result holds because any test
c a nb ea p p r o x i m a t e db yﬁnite tests (a corollary of proposition 2)a n d ,b yp r o p o s i t i o n
1,a n yﬁnite test that does not reject the truth can be ignorantly passed.
There is an interesting contrast between propositions 6 and 7. Assume that Alice
tests Bob with the rejection test associated with the global category test and Bob
is not knowledgeable. By proposition 7, Bob can use random generator of theories
ˆ ζm to delay rejection for m periods. A limit, ˆ ζ, of (a subsequence) of these random
generators of theories exists (because ∆∆(Ω) is compact in the weak*-topology). By
propositions 2 and 6, ˆ ζ does not delay rejection indeﬁnitely, with strictly positive
probability. Moreover, since Alice uses a rejection test, given any δ>0, ˆ ζ does
not delay rejection for m periods, with probability δ, if m is suﬃciently large. So,
a change from ˆ ζm to ˆ ζ (that becomes arbitrarily small as m increases) triggers an
abrupt transformation: rejection delay, that was formerly assured with arbitrarily
22high probability, is no longer assured even with small probability. Therefore, to delay
rejection for m periods (m large) Bob must choose the random generator of theories
in a very precise way.
6. Rejecting Theories Out of Hand
Proposition 7 shows that the class of permissible theories must be restricted. This
does follow from a need to simplify the analysis, but rather because in the absence
of such restrictions a completely ignorant expert can delay rejection for arbitrarily
many periods, on all future realizations of the data. This diﬃculty is hard to overcome
unless we relax the main assumption of proposition 7: that test that does not reject
the truth.14 So, we allow the test to reject some theories out of hand (i.e., on all paths).
This is clearly not a desiderata because potentially correct theories are rejected by
deﬁnition. Even so, the test may remain powerless to reject a false expert with
bounded data sets.
Deﬁnition 12. A test T does not reject an informed expert with probability 1 − ε
if for every theory P ∈ ∆(Ω) there exists a theory ˜ P ∈ ∆(Ω) such that
P
n
s ∈ Ω | T(s, ˜ P)=1
o
> 1 − ε.
The test T d o e sn o tr e j e c ta ni n f o r m e de x p e r ti fB o b ,k n o w i n gt h a tt h ed a t a
generating process is P, can announce a theory ˜ P that passes the test. Clearly, if a
test that does not reject the truth then it does not reject an informed expert, but the
converse is not necessarily true.
The falsiﬁability test rejects the truth, but does not reject an informed expert
with arbitrarily high probability. Fix δ>0. Assume that an informed expert knows
that the data generating process is a non-falsiﬁable theory P.L e tDP be a closed set
with empty interior such that P(DP) ≥ 1 − δ (see proposition 3 for the existence of




for all B ∈ =.
14An alternative, not taken in this paper, is to impose complexity bounds on Bob’s strategies.
23By lemma 2 (in the appendix), ˜ P is a falsiﬁable theory and, by deﬁnition, any
set D ˜ P that has full ˜ P−measure, has P−probability greater than 1 − δ. So, with
arbitrarily high probability, an informed expert can pass the falsiﬁability test by
announcing ˜ P.
Consider any dense set Λ ⊆ ∆(Ω) of probability measures in the topology induced
by the sup-norm.15 Let T be any test that does not reject the truth with probability
1−ε.L e tT0 b et h et e s tt h a tc o i n c i d e sw i t hT on Λ, but rejects out of hand theories
outside Λ.T h a ti s ,T0(s,P)=T(s,P) if P ∈ Λ and T0(s,P)=0if P ∈ (Λ)
c . Then,
T0 does not reject an informed expert with probability 1−ε−δ for every δ ∈ (0,1−ε].
Propositions 1 and 7 still hold if the assumption that the test does not reject the
truth with probability 1 − ε is replaced by the weaker assumption that the test does
not reject an informed expert with probability 1−ε (the proofs in the appendix make
this weaker assumption). Hence, an uniformed expert can still, with high probability,
arbitrarily delay rejection by the test T0 (that rejects out of hand all theories outside
Λ). In particular, rejection can be arbitrarily delayed if T0 rejects out of hand ﬁnitely
many theories.
We now consider a smaller set of permissible theories. Meteorological forecasts
are usually evaluated by how low their Brier Score is (see Brier (1950)).16 Al o wB r i e r
Score is not possible if the forecasts are often close to 0.5.G i v e nδ>0 and m ∈ N,









15The sup-norm is such that given two theories P and P/,
° ° °P − P/
° ° ° =s u p
A∈=
¯ ¯ ¯P(A) − P/(A)
¯ ¯ ¯.







24The set Λm,δ excludes theories that forecast 1 and 0 with near equal odds, suﬃ-
ciently often, until period m.
Fix δ>0 and b ∈ (0, 0.5). Given any theory P, let ¯ P be the theory such that:
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That is, given a theory P, the theory ¯ P forecast 1 with probability: 1
2 + b when
the P forecast (of 1)i sh i g h ; 1
2 when the P forecast is intermediate; and 1
2 − b when
the P forecast is low.
Let β ≡ (δ, m,b, K),w h e r eK ∈ N. Let Tβ be the test
T
β(s,P)=
1 if ¯ P(C(sm)) ≥ K(0.5)m, sm = s | m;
0 otherwise.
The test Tβ is akin, but not identical, to a calibration test. Deﬁne a success
when the observed outcome was forecasted with probability greater than 0.5(1 + δ).
Deﬁne a failure when the observed outcome was forecasted with probability smaller
than 0.5(1−δ). The test Tβ requires the frequency of success to be greater than the
frequency of failure (by a factor that depends on b, m, and K).17
The test Tβ rejects (or not) any theory at period m.S o ,b yd e ﬁnition, Tβ cannot
be ε−manipulated if and only if rejection by Tβ cannot be delayed, with probability
ε, by m periods.
Proposition 8. For any ε>0,δ>0 and K ∈ N, there exist b>0 and ¯ m ∈ N such
that if m ≥ ¯ m then Tβ does not reject any theory P ∈ Λm,δ with probability 1 − ε.
Moreover, if Kε > 1 then rejection by the test Tβ cannot be delayed, with probability
ε, by m periods.
17See Seidenfeld (1985) for a decomposition of the Brier Score into a calibration test related to
Tβ and a reﬁnement term that is maximized when the empirical frequency of 1 is 0.5.
25By proposition 8, the test Tβ cannot be manipulated even with limited data. So,
feasible rejection by Tβ cannot be arbitrarily delayed. Moreover, it is improbable that
Tβ rejects a theory that coincides with the data generating process, provided that it
belongs to the domain of permissible theories.
We now show a formal sense in which the restricted set of allowed theories Λm,δ
can be considered a large set.18
Proposition 9. The set Λm,δ is an open subset of ∆(Ω) for any δ>0 and m ∈ N.
If δ ∈ (0,0.25) then given any theory P ∈ ∆(Ω) and a neighborhood U of P,t h e r e
exist ˆ m ∈ N and a theory Q such that Q ∈ U ∩ Λm,δ for every m ≥ ˆ m.19
So, by proposition 9, Λm,δ is an open set and, any open set intersects Λm,δ if m is
large enough.
We hope that these results provide the groundwork for future advances on the
capability of empirical tests with bounded data sets. However, our results leave
open several relevant issues. Among them is the matter of the minimum size of
the data required to make the test non-manipulable, how plausible is the dismissal
of an uninformed expert, which tests minimize the need for restrictions on the set
of permissible theories and which class of theories should be rejected out of hand.
Answers to these questions are beyond the scope of this paper.
6.1. Intuition of Proposition 8
The proof that Tβ does not reject any theory P ∈ Λm,δ with high probability is a
straightforward application of the law of large numbers. An outcome tend to occur
more often when it is correctly forecasted with high probability than when it is cor-
rectly forecasted with low probability. The proof that Tβ cannot be ε−manipulated
18The set Λm,δ is not topologically large in the sense that its complement is a ﬁrst category set. We
can show that any set with similar properties to those of Λm,δ is not large in this sense. Proposition
9 asserts that Λm,δ is topologically large in a slightly weaker sense.
19The theory Q makes the same forecasts as P for several periods and subsequently forecast 1
with high probability.
26(when Kε > 1) is also simple. At period m,t h e r ea r e2m possible histories. A theory
P is rejected unless ¯ P assigns suﬃciently high probability to the observed history. So,
rejection occurs in all paths, except for, at most, 2m/K of them. Hence, the following
analogy matches Bob’s problem well: Bob faces an urn with many balls. Nature picks
a ball with unknown odds. Before the chosen ball is revealed, Bob selects, perhaps at
random, a small fraction of all possible balls. Then, no matter how Bob randomizes,
Bob cannot be near certain that the ball chosen by Nature belongs to his selected set.
It is remarkable that, to be properly formalized into a non-manipulable test, such
easy and compelling intuition requires a sizeable set of theories rejected out of hand.
7. Conclusion
If an empirical examiner plans to set aside false theories then it must be feasible to
reject theories produced by false experts who have no relevant knowledge. Empirical
tests with this property are non-manipulable tests. If a rejection is to be a reliable
signal that the theory makes incorrect predictions then a theory that forecasts exactly
like the data generating process must be rejected with low probability. Empirical tests
with this property do not reject the truth.
There is a conﬂict between these two properties. Empirical tests put forward in
the literature do not reject the truth, but can be manipulated. Extensive classes of
empirical tests, like acceptance tests, can also be manipulated if they do not reject
the truth. One test, the global category test, does not reject the truth and cannot
be manipulated. However, any test that does not reject the truth is susceptible to
strategic manipulation for arbitrary long periods of time.
An option is to reject some theories out of hand. With this proviso, some tests,
akin to those used in practice, do not reject allowed theories (with high probability)
and cannot be manipulated. We hope that this result will motivate future advances
in the subject matter of strategic manipulation of empirical tests under (perhaps
unavoidably) restrictions on the class of permissible theories.
278. Proofs
To prove proposition 1 we need to introduce some terminology and auxiliary lemmas.
Let X be a metric space. Recall that a function f : X → R is lower semi-continuous
at an x ∈ X if for every sequence (xn)∞
n=1 converging to x:
∀ε>0 ∃N ∀n≥N f(xn) >f(x) − ε.
The function f is lower semi-continuous if it is lower semi-continuous at every x ∈ X.20
Lemma 1. Let U ⊂ X be an open set where X is a compact metric space. Equip X
with the σ−algebra of Borel subsets. Let ∆(X) be the set of all probability measures




Proof: Take a probability measure P ∈ ∆(X); we will show that the function F
is lower semi-continuous at P. To this end take a sequence Pn →n P and an ε>0;
consider a closed set A ⊂ U such that
P(A) >P(U) − ε/2,
and a continuous function g : Ω → [0,1] such that
∀s∈A g(s)=1and ∀s/ ∈U g(s)=0 ;
such a set A exists as every open set in a metric space can be represented as the union
of an ascending sequence of closed sets, and such a function g exists by the Urysohn
Lemma (see, for example, Engelking (1989), Theorem 1.5.11).
20See Engelking (1989), Problem 1.7.14 for these deﬁnitions and some basic results regarding lower
semi-continuous functions.




¯ ¯ <ε / 2.
Thus, if n ≥ N,t h e n
F(Pn)=Pn(U) ≥ E
Png ≥ E
Pg−ε/2 ≥ P(A)−ε/2 >P(U)−ε/2−ε/2=F(P)−ε.
¥
Theorem (Fan (1953) Let X be a compact and Hausdorﬀ,l i n e a rs p a c ea n dY a
linear space (not necessarily topologized).21 Let f be a real-valued function on X ×Y
such that for every y ∈ Y , f(x,y) is lower semi-continuous on X.I ff is convex on










P r o o fo ft h eP r o p o s i t i o n1 :We prove proposition 1 under a weaker assumption
that the test T does not reject an informed expert with probability 1 − ε.L e tX be
∆(Ω).L e tY be the subset of ∆(∆(Ω)) of all random generator of theories with ﬁnite
support. So, an element ζ of Y can be described by a ﬁnite sequence of probability
measures {P1,...,Pn} and positive weights {π1,...,πn} that add to one (i.e., ζ selects









We now check that the assumptions of Fan’s theorem are satisﬁed. Since T is an
acceptance test, the set
UQ = {s ∈ Ω : T(s,Q)=1 }




21Fan does not assume that X and Y are linear spaces. We, however, apply his theorem only to
linear spaces.
29is a lower semi-continuous function of P.T h u s ,f o re v e r yζ ∈ Y , the function f(P,ζ) is
lower semi-continuous on X as a weighted average of lower semi-continuous functions.
By deﬁnition, f is linear on X and Y , and so it is convex on X and concave on Y .
By the Riesz and Banach-Alaoglu Theorems, X is a compact space in weak∗-topology;
it is a metric space, and so Hausdorﬀ, (see for example Rudin (1973), Theorem 3.17).














Notice that the left-hand side of this equality exceeds 1−ε, as the test T is assumed
not to reject an informed expert with probability 1−ε; indeed, for a given P ∈ ∆(Ω),
take ζ such that ζ({ ˜ P})=1 . Therefore the right-hand side exceeds 1−ε,w h i c hy i e l d
the existence of a random generator of theories ζ ∈ ∆(∆(Ω)) such that
E
ζE
PT>1 − ε − δ
for every P ∈ ∆(Ω). Taking, for any given s ∈ Ω, the probability measure P such
that P({s})=1 ,w eo b t a i n
ζ({Q ∈ ∆(Ω):T(s,Q)=1 }) > 1 − ε − δ.
¥
Lemma 2. If a theory P ∈ ∆(Ω) is falsiﬁable then ¯ AP ∈ = is a closed, full measure
set with empty interior. If there exists a closed set ¯ A ∈ = with empty interior such
that P( ¯ A)=1then P is falsiﬁable.
Proof : Suppose ﬁrst that P is falsiﬁable. The set (AP)c is open as a union of
open sets (cylinders). By deﬁnition of falsiﬁability and the topology in Ω,t h es e t
(AP)c is dense. Finally, since the set of all cylinders is countable, and (AP)c is a
union of cylinders C such that P(C)=0 , (AP)c is a set of measure 0. Therefore, its
complement AP is a closed, full measure set with empty interior.
Suppose now that there exists a closed set A with empty interior such that P(A)=
1. Since the complement A
c
of A is a dense set, A
c
∩C(st) 6= ∅ for every ﬁnite history
30st ∈ {0,1}t,a n ds i n c eA
c
is an open set, so is A
c
∩ C(st). Therefore there exists a
cylinder C ⊂ A
c
∩ C(st).S i n c e C ⊂ C(st), C = C(sm) for some extension sm of
history st,a n ds i n c eC ⊂ A
c
, P(C) ≤ P(A
c
)=0 .¥
Proof of Proposition 5: Let T be the falsiﬁability test. It is immediate from
lemma 2 that T is a category test. We now show that T can be ignorantly passed
with probability 1−ε,ε > 0. Without loss of generality assume that ε ∈ (0,0.5). Let









Let ˆ P ∈ ∆(Ω) be the probability measure such that both 1 and 0 have equal odds




Xt of sets Xt. It is also convenient to consider a sequence of
independent random variables ˜ Xt, t ∈ N, uniformly distributed on the set Xt.L e t
˜ X be the random variable
Y
t∈N
˜ Xt, distributed on the set X = Ω, such that ˜ X = x if






Given an x ∈ X, x =( x1,....,xt,...),x t ∈ Xt, let






be the union of the cylinder with base on x1 ∈ X1 and the cylinders with base on ﬁnite
histories of the form (zt,x t+1),t∈ N, where zt is an arbitrary element of {0,1}Zt.

















c be the complement of Cx,x∈ X,a n dl e t ˆ Px be the conditional proba-
bility of ˆ P on (Cx)
c ,x∈ X. That is,
ˆ P
x(A)=




for all A ∈ =.
Step 1: We now show that ˆ Px is falsiﬁable.
Indeed, the set (Cx)
c is closed (the complement of an open set) and has ˆ Px full
measure. For any cylinder C(st),s t ∈ {0,1}t,t a k eaZm ≥ t and an extension
zm ∈ {0,1}Zm of st. Then, by deﬁnition, C(zm,x m+1) ⊂ Cx and C(zm,x m+1) ⊂
C(st). Hence, the set C(st) ∩ Cx is non-empty. This means that (Cx)
c contains
no cylinder, or, in other words, it has empty interior. By lemma 2, ˆ Px is falsiﬁable.
Step 2: Let C(sn),s n ∈ {0,1}n, be a cylinder not contained in Cx. We show that
ˆ P(C(sn) ∩ (Cx)
c) > 0.
Let ˆ Psn denote ˆ P conditional on sn. By Bayes’ rule,







Let ˆ Cx be the ﬁnite union of all cylinders in Cx with base on a history of length
s m a l l e ro re q u a lt on.S o ,ˆ Cx is a ﬁnite union of cylinders C (rm) ⊂ Cx, where
m ≤ n. The history sn cannot be an extension of any of the histories {(zt,x t+1) |
32zt ∈ {0,1}Zt,t ∈ N} or x1. Otherwise, C(sn) ⊂ Cx. Thus, C (rm) ∩ C(sn)=∅ if






Let ¯ Cx be the union of all cylinders in Cx with base on a history of length strictly
greater than n.S o ,i f k =0 ,1,... is the smallest number such that n<Z k+1,t h e n
¯ Cx is the union of the sets C(zt,x t+1), t ≥ k and zt ∈ {0,1}Zt (and the set C(x1) if
k =0 ). Suppose ﬁrst that that k =0 . Then, ˆ Psn assigns probability either 0.5Z1−n or
0 to the cylinder C(x1) (depending on whether x1 is an extension of sn). Moreover,
ˆ Psn assigns probability 1
2Mt+1 to the union of C(zt,x t+1),z t ∈ {0,1}Zt. Hence,




2Mt < 0.5+ε<1. (8.3)







Cx = ˆ Cx ∪ ¯ Cx,a n ds o




Step 3: We show that Cx is the union of all cylinders C ∈ =0 such that ˆ Px(C)=0 .
Let C ∈ =0 be an arbitrary cylinder. If ˆ Px(C)=0then ˆ P(C ∩ (Cx)
c)=0 .
By Step 2, C is contained in Cx. On the other hand, if C is contained in Cx then
C ∩ (Cx)
c = ∅. Hence, ˆ Px(C)=0 .
It follows from Steps 1 and 3 that
T(s, ˆ P
x)=
0 if s ∈ Cx;
1 if s/ ∈ Cx.
33Fix a path s ∈ Ω. Let s be (¯ s1,...., ¯ st.,...) where ¯ st ∈ Xt. So, ¯ s1 are the ﬁrst M1
outcomes of s and ¯ st+1 are the Mt+1 outcomes that follow the ﬁrst Zt outcomes of s.
By deﬁnition, s ∈ Cx if and only if ¯ st = xt for some t ∈ N. Hence,
n
x ∈ X | T(s, ˆ P
x)=0
o





















t <ε . (8.5)
Let ζ ∈ ∆(∆(Ω)) be such that ˆ Px is selected whenever ˜ X = x. It follows from









P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 :Since




















for all k ∈ N,















also for all k ∈ N, which yields that P( ˆ AP)=1 .22 Thus, the global category test does
not reject the truth with probability one. It remains to show that the test cannot be


























is a closed set with empty interior.
34manipulated. Suppose we are given a ζ ∈ ∆∆(Ω).W eﬁrst show that there exist a
subset ˆ A of Ω, which is a countable union of closed sets with empty interior, and a
Borel set B ⊂ ∆(Ω) such that:
ζ (B)=1 , (8.6)
∀P∈B ˆ AP ⊂ ˆ A. (8.7)
We show later (in corollary 2, following this proof) that for every s the set {P ∈
∆(Ω):s ∈ ˆ AP} is Borel. Since
B ⊂ {P ∈ ∆(Ω):s ∈ ˆ AP}
for every s ∈ Ω − ˆ A, we will obtain that
∀s∈Ω− ˆ A ζ
³
{P ∈ ∆(Ω):s ∈ ˆ AP}
´
=0 .
This means that Ω− ˆ A ⊂ R0
ζ, and so the complement of R0
ζ is a ﬁrst category set. To
complete the proof one has to apply proposition 4.
We will now construct sets ˆ A and B with properties (8.6)-(8.7). Consider the sets
B
i
k(m) ≡ {P ∈ ∆(Ω):t(i,k,P) >m };
lemma 3, following this proof, shows that the sets Bi
k(m) are open, and so Borel.
Since this sequence of sets is descending (with respect to m, for given k and i)a n d











k(l) ≡ Ω − C(s
i


















The set A(l) is a countable union of closed sets with empty interior by an argument





To show that (8.6)-(8.7) are satisﬁed, notice that, by the deﬁnition of Bi
k(m) for
m = mi
k(l),i fP/ ∈ Bi
k(m),t h e nC(si
m) ⊂ Ck
P(si
t) for t = t(i,k,P);t h e r e f o r e







k(l)),t h e nAk(P) ⊂ Ak(l),
which in turn yields that


























⊂ {P ∈ ∆(Ω): ˆ AP ⊂ ˆ A}.





































for every l ∈ N.¥
Lemma 3. For every t ∈ N, the set
B
i
k(t) ≡ {P ∈ ∆(Ω):t(i,k,P) >t }
is open.
36Proof: Let P ∈ Bi















indeed, the sequence sets C(si
t) − C(si
m) is ascending (as m goes to inﬁnity), and its
union is equal to C(si
t) − {si}.
Note that each cylinder is an open and closed subset of Ω,a n ds oi sC(si
t)−C(si
m).
Thus, the function f : Ω → R given by:



















and let the set N(P) stands for all measures Q ∈ ∆(Ω) such that





¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ <δ .










¯ ¯ <δ ;










which implies that Q ∈ Bk
i (t).
That is, the set N(P), which is an open neighborhood of P in weak∗-topology, is
contained in Bi
k(t).¥
37Corollary 2. For every s ∈ Ω, the set {P ∈ ∆(Ω):s ∈ ˆ AP} is Borel.
Proof: If s = si for some i ∈ N,t h e n{P ∈ ∆(Ω):s ∈ ˆ AP} = ∆(Ω) by
deﬁnition. Suppose therefore that s 6= si for any i ∈ N.I ts u ﬃces to show that the
sets {P ∈ ∆(Ω):s ∈ Ck
P(si
t),t= t(i,k,P)} are Borel, as




















m+1);s i n c es 6= si and Ck
P(si
0)=∆(Ω),
such m is unique. Observe now that




t),t= t(i,k,P)} = ∆(Ω) − {P ∈ ∆(Ω):t(i,k,P) >m },
and so the set {P ∈ ∆(Ω):s ∈ Ck
P(si
t),t= t(i,k,P)} is closed by lemma 3.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7 :We prove proposition 7 under a weaker assumption
that the test T does not reject an informed expert with probability 1−ε.N o t i c eﬁrst
that proposition 2 also applies (by a similar argument) to tests that do not reject an
informed expert with probability 1 − ε. That is, there exists a rejection test Tδ that
is harder then T and does not reject an informed expert with probability 1−ε−δ/2.
By construction, the rejection sets (AP)
c (of the test Tδ) a r eac o u n t a b l eu n i o no f
disjoint cylinders Ci
P,i∈ N, with base on ﬁnite histories. Let Tδ,m be the test such
that the rejection sets (Am
P )
c are the ﬁnite union of all cylinders Ci
P with base on a
history on {0,1}m. By deﬁnition, Tδ is harder than Tδ,m . So, Tδ,m does not reject an
informed expert with probability 1 − ε − δ/2. Moreover, Tδ,m is a ﬁnite test. Hence,
by proposition 1,t h e r ee x i s t sζT,m such that for every history s ∈ {0,1}∞
ζT,m
©
P ∈ ∆(Ω) | T
δ,m (s,P)=0
ª
≤ ε + δ.
Let sm be any ﬁnite history on {0,1}m such that T(sm,P)=0 . Given that Tδ
is harder than T it follows that Tδ(sm,P)=0 . By deﬁnition, C(sm) ⊆ (AP)
c and,
therefore, C(sm) ⊆ (Am
P )
c . So, T(sm,P)=0implies that Tδ,m (sm,P)=0 . Thus,
{P ∈ ∆(Ω) | T (sm,P)=0 } ⊆
©




38So, for every sm ∈ {0,1}m,ζ T,m{P ∈ ∆(Ω) | T(sm,P)=0 } ≤ ε + δ.¥
Proof of Proposition 8.F i x ε>0,δ>0 and K ∈ N.W e ﬁrst show that
there exist b>0 and ¯ m ∈ N such that if m ≥ ¯ m then Tβ does not reject any theory
P ∈ Λm,δ with probability 1 − ε.






















Indeed, notice that at b =0the left-hand side is equal to the right-hand side and
the derivative of the right-hand side (at b =0 )i se q u a lt oδ/2 > 0.
Fix such a b>0.
Step 2: Consider the Bernoulli scheme with the probability of success equal to
1
2 + δ
2. By the law of large numbers, there exists an n ∈ N such that for every n ≥ n
the success rate exceeds 1
2 + δ











































There exists ¯ m ∈ N such that if m ≥ ¯ m then for any P ∈ Λm,δ and s ∈ Ω that


























39since the right-hand side of this inequality cannot exceed δ for suﬃciently large m,
we obtain a contradiction with P ∈ Λm,δ.23
Let now b nm(P,s) denote the number of periods t ≤ m that satisfy the following
condition: fP
t−1(s) ∈ [0, 1
2 − δ
2) and It(s)=0or fP
t−1(s) ∈ (1
2 + δ
2,1] and It(s)=1 .B y
construction, for any m ≥ ¯ m and P ∈ Λm,δ the set
B(m,P)=
½































































where n = nm(P,s). By 8.11, if m ≥ ¯ m then nm(P,s) ≥ n and, by construction,
B(m,P) has P−probability 1 − ε (or larger). So, if m ≥ ¯ m then ¯ P(C(sm)) exceeds
K(0.5)m with P−probability 1 − ε (or larger).
We now show that if Kε > 1 then rejection by the test Tβ cannot be delayed,





the largest integer no
larger than 2m
K . Let Z be the set of all z ∈ IF such that no two coordinates of z are
equal. By Zi,i∈ I, denote the subset of Z that consists all elements z ∈ Z such that
one (and only one) coordinate of z is equal to i.L e txz ∈ [0,1],z∈ Z.
Step 1:W es h a l ls h o wﬁr s tt h a ti f
X
z∈Zi
xz ≥ ε, (8.12)
for all i ∈ I,t h e n
X
z∈Z
xz ≥ Kε. (8.13)
23We assume here that δ<4,b u ti fδ ≥ 4,t h e nΛm,δ = ∅.
40Indeed, any z ∈ Z belongs to a set Zi if (and only if) i is one of the coordinates











Step 2:At h e o r yP passes the test Tβ only on the histories sm to which ¯ P assigns
probability greater than K
2m.F o re a c hP, there are at most F histories sm with this
property. Let T0 be any test easier than T such that each theory P passes T0 on
exactly F histories sm.
Identify I with the set of all possible histories sm.G i v e naz ∈ Z,l e tΛz stand for
the set of all probability measures that pass T0 on all histories sm from the range of
z.G i v e nz 6= z0, Λz ∩ Λz0 = ∅ because no theory can pass T0 on the ranges of z and
z0 simultaneously (together they contain more than F histories sm). Fix ζ ∈ ∆∆(Ω).
Let xz ≡ ζ(Λz). Assume, to the contrary, that ζ can delay rejection of T0 by m periods
with probability ε. Then, by deﬁnition, (8.12) is satisﬁed and, by Step 1,s oi s( 8 . 1 3 ) .
It is, however, a contradiction because
1 ≥
X
ζ(Λz) ≥ Kε > 1.
¥
Proof of Proposition 9: (i) Take any probability measure P ∈ Λm,δ.F o ra n y
s ∈ Ω and t ≤ m deﬁne functions gs,t,h s,t : Ω → R by
gs,t(r)=1if rt−1 = st−1 and gs,t(r)=0otherwise,
hs,t(r)=1if rt = st and hs,t(r)=0otherwise.





¯ ¯ <ε ,
then the measure assigned by P and Q to the cylinder C(st−1) are as close as we





¯ ¯ <ε ,
41then the measure assigned by P and Q to the cylinder C(st) are as close as we wish.




t−1(s) are as close as we wish, which (by deﬁn i t i o n )i m p l i e st h a t
Q ∈ Λm,δ,a ss od o e sP.
(ii)T a k ea n yP ∈ ∆(Ω), continuous functions h1,...,h l : Ω → R,a n dp o s i t i v er e a l
numbers ε1,...,εl. It follows from the continuity of h1,...,hl and the compactness of
Ω that there exists a (large enough) k ∈ N such that
rk = sk =⇒∀ i=1,...,l |hi(r) − hi(s)| <ε i.
Thus, if two probability measures P and Q have the property that






¯ ¯ <ε i.
Take a probability measure Q satisfying (8.14) with the following property: for
any s ∈ Ω and t>k
f
Q






By (8.15), Q ∈ Λm,δ whenever m is suﬃciently large, and by (8.14), Q belongs to
the neighborhood of the probability measure P determined by h1,...,hl : Ω → R and
ε1,...,εl.¥
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